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Infrastructure and Criminal Law
INTRODUCTION
It is April 12, 2018. Dozens of terrorists just attacked the United States 
in a conspiracy to launch a cyberattack on the power grid. Cities around 
the country lose electricity immediately. Utility providers and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) respond quickly, but the 
terrorists have also physically attacked the backup transformers and cut off 
power lines essential for restoring electricity. A third of the United States is 
without power and will be for weeks, causing great inconvenience, billions 
of dollars in damage, and—in some cases—serious bodily injury or death. 
Americans depend on electricity culturally, economically, and politically. 
Without electricity, it would be impossible to charge cell phones and computers; 
receive news or get on the Internet; pump gas, preserve food, access clean water, 
heat homes; or retrieve money. Doctors would be powerless to keep many of 
their hospital patients alive, and the military would be unable to coordinate 
strategy or communicate. The effects of electricity loss would be apocalyptic.
This scenario is not farfetched; an attack on the United States’ electricity 
infrastructure could really happen. If it did happen, the federal government 
is ill-equipped, both to restore the grid and to prosecute the terrorists. 
Unfortunately, Americans have had enough experience with terrorism 
to have learned how not to address the issue. The first step to addressing a 
national security risk must be to debate the character of the problem.1 The 
problem is that the United States’ electricity grid is old and haphazardly 
patched together; as a result, it is extremely vulnerable to attack.2
The U.S. electricity grid is in the initial stages of transformation to a 
Smart Grid, which will take twenty-five to thirty years.3 One purpose of this 
transformation is to improve security.4 More specifically, the government’s
goal is to make the electrical system resistant to natural disasters and various 
forms of attack. 
Copyright 2018, by MELISSA WHEELER.
1. Richard Danzig, Foreword to ANDREAS WEGNER & RETO WOLLENMANN,
BIOTERRORISM: CONFRONTING A COMPLEX THREAT, at vii (2008). 
2. GRETCHEN BAKKE, GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN AMERICANS 
AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE, at xiv (2016). 
3. The Future of the Grid, SMARTGRID, https://perma.cc/AN23-RMB9 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
4. See What is the Smart Grid?, SMARTGRID, https://perma.cc/J3GP-NPNA
(last visited Jan. 21, 2017). 
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While energy sector actors are trying to identify vulnerabilities in the 
current grid, the legal system has yet to respond to the evolution or the
risks of the infrastructure.
The legal regime criminalizing terrorism must evolve with the electricity 
infrastructure to anticipate sophisticated terrorist threats. Preparation is 
essential to national security; according to the U.S. Department of Justice,
prevention of terrorism and promotion of the nation’s security consistent 
with the rule of law is an essential strategic goal.5 This goal will be 
impossible to accomplish until there are sufficient laws on the subject.6
There are no federal criminal laws that condemn cyberattacks against 
electricity-utilities’ computer systems or the physical attacks a terrorist 
might perpetrate. Even on an international scale, the failure of nation-
states to create a single definition of terrorism leaves electric grids and 
millions of people unprotected. There must be a comprehensive legal 
framework to simplify the prosecution of terrorists and protect citizens 
from long-term blackouts. 
This article will emphasize the importance of preparedness as a means to 
enhancing national security and promoting peace of mind. Part I will explain 
how the electricity infrastructure works and further, will describe the proposed 
Smart Grid. Part II will explain how the grid is vulnerable to both physical 
and cyber terrorist attacks. Part III will explain shortcomings in both 
international and domestic anti-terrorist law. Part IV will propose solutions 
for how the criminal justice system can adequately address an attack.
I. THE ELECTRIC GRID
A. History of the Grid 
Electricity is a fundamental part of American life and therefore 
essential to national security. Knowing the history of the grid is crucial to 
understanding its current design, vulnerabilities, and the industry’s need 
to upgrade to the Smart Grid. The grid exists in its current form for two 
                                                                                                            
5. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
2014-2018 STRATEGIC PLAN 13 (2012) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN].
6. An attack on electricity infrastructure may not seem as dramatic as an 
attack on nuclear structure or bioterrorism. While romanticizing the tragic end of 
our democracy is a fascinating pastime, risks of both nuclear and biological 
attacks are explored extensively in scholarly literature and are specifically 
addressed in our laws. Attacks on electricity infrastructure are not specifically
addressed. See generally CHARLES FERGUSON ET AL., THE FOUR FACES OF 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM (2005); WEGNER & WOLLENMANN, supra note 1.
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reasons: (1) the nature of electricity and (2) the methods that its discoverers 
used to make electricity accessibility cheaper for the general public. 
The electric grid is a power delivery system.7 Researchers first explored 
the nature of electricity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.8 Because 
magnetic movement of electrons—electricity—is instantaneous, electricity 
must be consumed the moment it is produced and before it converts to heat 
energy.9 Researchers found that an efficient electric system requires a 
connected grid of wires to carry electricity straight from its generation to 
its use.10
After thinking about how to make electricity accessible and affordable, 
scientists concluded that generators would need to be connected to many 
users at once.11 Therefore, they built grids to maximize the scale of the 
operation at a minimal cost.12
The resulting technological advances in generation and transmission 
quickly led to the aggregation of small companies into larger monopolies 
over U.S. regions.13 The first electricity supply systems were private and 
unregulated.14 Utility companies made bilateral and multilateral agreements 
to pool power; over decades, economies of scale15 and technological 
advancement led to very large power markets and huge interconnected 
regions sharing electricity.16
Today, these power markets are so large that the United States has a 
total of only three of them.17 One grid provides electricity for the West, a bit 
of Mexico, and much of western Canada; the second for all of the East; and 
the third for Texas exclusively.18 Through these grids, energy is generated 
from many power sources, sent through power lines to substations and 
                                                                                                            
7. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, TERRORISM & THE 
ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 21 (2012).
8. History of Electricity, INST. FOR ENERGY RES., https://perma.cc/9YQ7-
5M9Z (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7.
14. Id. at 20.
15. Economies of scale arise when average costs decline with the increasing 
size of a unit. See generally Raymond Hartman, The Efficiency Effects of Electric 
Utility Mergers: Lessons from Statistical Cost Analysis, 17 ENERGY L.J. 425 (1996). 
16. Id.
17. BAKKE, supra note 2. 
18. Id. Texas chooses to manage its entire electricity infrastructure independently. 
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transformers, distributed by utility companies, and finally consumed by 
the public.19
The private sector owns more than eighty percent of the electricity 
infrastructure system;20 this system contains approximately 6,413 power 
plants.21 From those power plants, more than 200,000 miles of power lines 
transfer electricity to almost all of the 318 million people in the United 
States.22 As a whole, the United States’ electric power industry includes over 
3,000 businesses, institutions, and regulatory bodies.23 All of these actors 
must cooperate for the system to function. An attack on this infrastructure
has the potential to affect every single actor, from plants to individuals. 
B. The Innovations of the Smart Grid 
Currently, electricity infrastructure is going through extensive changes 
to become a “Smart Grid.” The Smart Grid is: “[t]he integration and
application of real-time monitoring, advanced sensing, communications, 
analytics, and control, enabling the dynamic flow of both energy and 
information to accommodate existing and new forms of supply, delivery, 
and use in a secure, reliable, and efficient electric power system, from 
generation source to end-user.”24
The principal purpose of the Smart Grid is to update the electricity 
infrastructure because the grid has aged quickly and has not been 
significantly redesigned since it was originally implemented.25 Over seventy 
percent of transformers and transmission lines are twenty-five years old; 
power plants, on average, are thirty-four years old.26 The age of the 
infrastructure has personal and economic costs because as the grid ages, it 
is more likely to break down, which causes intermittent power outages. 
Every year, both the number of power outages and the length of time 
power outages last continue to increase in direct correlation to the age of 
the infrastructure.27 In most industrialized countries, blackouts last less 
                                                                                                            
19. Sarah Gerrity & Allison Lantero, Infographic: Understanding the Grid,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 17, 2014, 2:05 PM), https://perma.cc/6FJE-DF4C.
20. Energy Sector, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://perma.cc/APN5-L6NE
(last updated July 11, 2017).
21. Id.
22. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7.
23. Id. at 23.
24. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FROM 
THE INTEGRATION OF THE SMART GRID 96 (2010), https://perma.cc/VRF6-2DLH.
25. Mark Chediack et al., Crumbling U.S. Grid Gets Jolt Driving Smart 
Houston Power, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/R3AP-PLJ7. 
26. BAKKE, supra note 2. 
27. Id. 
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than ten minutes, but in the United States the average outage is 120 
minutes.28 Outages cost the country over $188 billion annually.29 Ideally, 
once upgraded, the Smart Grid will facilitate more efficient transmission 
of electricity, quicker restoration of electricity after disturbances, reduced 
peak demand, reduced operations and management costs for utilities, 
increased integration of renewable energy systems, increased integration 
of customer-owner power generation, and improved security.30 The four 
main updates intended to make the grid “smarter” are: (1) Distribution 
Intelligence, (2) batteries, (3) microgrids, and (4) smart meters. 
First, Distribution Intelligence is a “self-healing” system designed to 
detect power outages and immediately respond to reroute energy around 
the outage.31 Distribution Intelligence is meant to pinpoint the source of 
the problem in transmission lines on its own.32 This system will 
incorporate fully automated rerouting of electricity when an outage occurs. 
Second, the electricity industry has also been working on developing 
new and stronger batteries. New energy storage technology helps to 
integrate renewable energy into the power grid by managing the supply of
energy.33 Scientists built the power grid to transmit a consistent flow of 
energy from generation to consumption.34 Yet, renewable energy, such as 
solar and wind power, is not generated in consistent amounts. Batteries 
alleviate this problem because they can collect and store energy until it is 
needed, allowing electricity to flow through the grid consistently. 
Third, microgrids are designed to protect the electric grid. If a 
disruption or outage on the grid occurs, microgrids can disconnect from 
the larger grid and function as an electrical island.35 Isolation of critical 
systems is essential to increasing the security of the grid because 
interconnection puts the entire system, rather than just individual parts, at 
risk.36
Lastly, smart meters are the parts of the grid that most directly impact 
the consumer. They facilitate communication between consumers and utility 
companies regarding energy use and notify utility companies immediately 
                                                                                                            
28. Id.
29. Improving Grid Reliability, TOLLGRADE, https://perma.cc/QX6X-ULP2 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
30. What is the Smart Grid?, supra note 4. 
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Gerrity & Lantero, supra note 19.
34. BAKKE, supra note 2, at xvi. 
35. Gerrity & Lantero, supra note 19.
36. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 44.
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when the power goes out.37 In 2014, 58.5 million smart meters were installed; 
about eighty-eight percent of them were residential.38 Even though smart 
meters are currently being implemented, their benefits will not be realized 
anytime soon. 
The industry has commenced implementation of the Smart Grid, but the 
upgrades will not be complete for decades.39 Until then, America’s system 
will be vulnerable to traditional forms of attack. Although transformation 
will take time and investment, having a “strong,” or resilient, grid is just as 
important as having a “smart” grid.40 The industry should move forward 
with changes that will truly improve security as citizens await the long-term 
improvements in design. 
II. THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE GRID TO A TERRORIST ATTACK
There is no evidence that the government is considering any new legal 
approaches to terrorism in the realm of energy infrastructure.41 The threat is 
not hypothetical. In 2013, the energy sector was the most targeted sector for 
hackers in the United States, accounting for fifty-six percent of the 257 
attacks reported to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.42 In 2015, 
according to the U.S. State Department, there were 255 terrorist attacks
targeting utility companies worldwide, out of 12,204 terrorist attacks
total.43 This section considers the vulnerabilities of the electricity 
infrastructure and risk of a terrorist attack in three parts: types of potential 
terrorist attacks; the likelihood that the Smart Grid will improve security; 
and the actual risk of an attack. Governments must consider all three issues 
as they develop and refine anti-terrorism laws. 
                                                                                                            
37. Gerrity & Lantero, supra note 19.
38. How Many Smart Meters are Installed in the United States and Who Has 
Them?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/T6UJ-YEM5 (last visited Jan. 
21, 2017). 
39. The Future of the Grid, supra note 3. 
40. Kennedy Maize, The Electric Grid: Civilization’s Achilles Heel?, POWER 
MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/YPL7-G2DB.
41. Matthew L. Wald, Terrorist Attack on Power Grid Could Cause Broad 
Hardship, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11
/15/science/earth/electric-industry-is-urged-to-gird-against-terrorist-attacks.html?_r=0.
42. Nicole Perlroth, Smart City Technology May Be Vulnerable to Hackers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2015, https://perma.cc/6K8N-2JK2.
43. NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO 
TERRORISM, ANNEX OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION: COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
TERRORISM 2015, 15 (2016). 
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A. Types of Attacks on Electricity Infrastructure
The current electricity infrastructure was not designed to withstand 
well-organized acts of terrorism aimed at key elements of the system.44
The grid is susceptible to two general types of attack: physical attack and 
cyberattack. 
Targets for physical attacks might include any equipment used in the 
production or transmission of electricity.45 Much of the equipment is so 
large that it must be located outdoors, where it is vulnerable to weapons 
ranging from rifles to laser-guided missiles.46 Because electric energy 
converts to heat, electricity equipment often operates at elevated temperatures. 
The high temperatures make the equipment even more susceptible to heat-
seeking missiles or homemade bombs.47 Even a drone strike could harm much 
of the outside equipment.48 Consider transmission towers that span thousands 
of miles. An attack on transmission towers could happen without observation 
in more remote parts of the nation.49 Transformers are other potential targets; 
if lost, they would require replacing, which creates considerable revenue loss. 
Large power transformers are challenging to replace because they are usually 
custom-made and can cost between three and ten million dollars each.50
Notably, the power industry has not publicly disclosed the number of these 
transformers; officials of the Department of Energy have stated that the 
agency is not even aware of the official number.51 Finally, other physical 
targets include the electric utility companies’ office buildings and warehouses. 
The loss of computers controlling parts of the grid could be devastating for 
many companies. Replacement of physical embodiments of the electricity 
infrastructure after an attack would be costly for the utility companies 
affected, the government, and the consumer. 
A cyberattack target might include any components used to monitor 
and control the production, transmission, and flow of electricity.52 An 
actor would have to intrude into the control systems through the Internet 
or the utility’s private networks. The interconnectedness of a benign social 
                                                                                                            
44. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, MAKING THE NATION SAFER:
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 177 (2002).
45. Id. at 181. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.
48. Drones: What Are They and How Do They Work?, BRITISH 
BROADCASTING CHANNEL (Jan. 31, 2012). 
49. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 181.
50. TED KOPPEL, LIGHTS OUT: A CYBERATTACK, A NATION UNPREPARED,
SURVIVING THE AFTERMATH 95 (2015). 
51. Id.
52. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 181.
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network, like the Internet, can also provide countless paths of access for 
an attacker.53 Cyberattacks are already common in the United States, but 
one unique challenge to addressing them is that both the target of a 
cyberattack and the attacker are disinclined to make the attack known for 
privacy or public relations reasons.54
Computerization of the electric industry makes it more vulnerable to 
cyberattack because companies rely on information management and 
computer systems. Computerization has reduced the need for personnel at 
key facilities such as electric substations and congested transmission 
corridors and has increased reliance on unsecured telecommunications or 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.55 SCADA 
systems allow automatic remote access to utilities and are designed to 
increase functionality rather than security.56 Because of their connection to 
the Internet, SCADA systems are extremely susceptible to cyber-intrusion.57
The use of simple technologies such as firewalls, encryption techniques, and 
surveillance technologies can help protect these systems. The issue with 
these technologies is that they are not designed to block and identify 
breaches as quickly as the rest of the SCADA systems operate.58
Another threat to the electric grid is an electromagnetic pulse attack 
(EMP). Similar to a cyberattack, an EMP would involve the introduction 
of radio or micro frequency waves into the circuits of the control systems, 
upsetting the electronics and leading to network destabilization and 
outages.59 This type of attack might not lead to a need to replace equipment, 
but an attack of this sort could affect enormous portions of the grid.60 Cyber 
and electromagnetic attacks are possible due to the multiple points of entry 
into systems and the number of Internet experts with the ability to perpetrate 
an attack. 
Since both physical and cyberattacks, on their own, could cause 
extensive damage, a terrorist attack combining them would certainly ensure 
a blackout. Measuring the cost of large-scale or long-duration blackouts is 
not easy. After the August 2003 blackout that struck the Midwest, the 
Northeast, and parts of Canada, the estimated final cost was six billion 
                                                                                                            
53. KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 63.
54. Id. at 9. 
55. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 178.
56. Jennifer Alvey, Digital Terrorism: Holes in the Firewall?, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., March 2002, at 12, 14.
57. Id. at 13.
58. Id. at 17.
59. MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 44, at 182.
60. Id.
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dollars.61 That blackout was not intentional—the combination of a 
computer bug and an overgrown tree caused fifty million people to lose 
power for two days.62 One projection from the National Research Council, 
based on a theoretical 2005 blackout of New Jersey Utility Public Service 
Electric & Gas found that a ninety-five percent loss of power in one day, 
and restoration of ten percent power after two months, would result in a 
loss of $389 billion for that state.63 Disruption from an intentional attack 
could cost the country billions of dollars. If large and extended outages 
occurred during severe weather, hundreds of people could die from 
exposure to extreme heat or cold.64 An isolated assault on an individual 
station, substation, or control center could cause a local disruption. A 
coordinated attack on multiple points in the system could potentially lead 
to a multistate blackout. Power would be restored in days or weeks at best, 
but acute shortages could result in rolling blackouts for years.65 Cascading 
failure is when the collapse of a system in one spot sets off a chain of 
failures. This occurred in the August 2003 blackout; the power failure 
spread from Detroit to New York in just a few moments.66 The enormity 
of target possibilities that could cause such a widespread blackout 
necessitates legal protection.
B. The Smart Grid and Resiliency in Case of Attack
Ideally, the implementation of the Smart Grid will decrease the 
vulnerability of the infrastructure to terrorist attacks. There are five main 
challenges to security that should be addressed as the industry updates the 
grid: (1) the large amount of consumer information the grid will transmit, 
(2) the greater number of control devices in the Smart Grid, (3) the poor 
physical security of a great portion of these devices, (4) the use of Internet 
Protocol as a communication standard, and (5) the greater number of 
stakeholders the grid will rely on for its smooth operation.67 According to 
a European study of the first steps of implementation of a Smart Grid, the 
                                                                                                            
61. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 16.
62. BAKKE, supra note 2, at xv. 
63. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 16.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 180-81.
66. Matthew L. Wald, As Worries Over the Power Grid Rise, a Drill Will 
Simulate a Knockout Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2013/08/17/us/as-worries-over-the-power-grid-rise-a-drill-will-simulate-a-knockout
-blow.html?_r=0. 
67. VINCENZO GIORDANO ET AL., EUR. COMM’N, SMART GRID PROJECTS IN
EUROPE: LESSONS LEARNED & CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 56 (2013). 
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information technology concept of “defense in depth”68 must be applied to 
a Smart Grid system to keep it secure—especially for SCADA systems—
even if protections become redundant.69
A loss of control over utilities’ control system communications would 
be disastrous. An inability to open and close circuit breakers, load signals 
to generators, or communicate with adjacent organizations would reduce 
the utility of the Smart Grid. The result would be a large-scale power 
outage and likely a slow recovery.70 Losing telemetry to individual devices 
or losing the ability to communicate with individual devices is fairly 
frequent and inconsequential; introduction of smart meters would mitigate 
this issue.71 An inability to communicate between SCADA and regional 
systems would be detrimental to real-time data exchange. Communication 
within the Smart Grid is essential to prevent cascading failure;72 loss of 
control of the grid would lead to unreliable operation and possibly a 
blackout.73
Although the Smart Grid has many benefits, the more electronic, 
sophisticated, and “smart”—or computer assisted—the system becomes, 
the more vulnerable it is to code hacking.74 Three of the main vulnerabilities 
are: inadequately secured wireless communication, use of a non-dedicated 
communications channel for command and control, and unauthenticated 
command and control data.75 One of the safest ways to protect the grid is 
to split it into “islands;” the less interconnected the grid is, the fewer the 
number of people that will be affected by an attack.76 Once implemented, 
the microgrid innovation would address and solve this issue. 
In its final state, a Smart Grid might prevent cascading blackouts with 
quick identification of failures in the grid and isolation of the issue, but the 
transition will take time. Smart meters enable utility companies to 
immediately recognize when the power goes off. Most disturbances happen 
                                                                                                            
68. “Defense in depth” is a strategy for mitigating cybersecurity threats. 
“Defense in depth” works by creating layers of protection to catch attacks. See 
generally Trevor Ford, Cybersecurity Legislation for an Evolving World, 50
U.S.F. L. REV. 119 (2016). 
69. GIORDANO ET AL., supra note 67 at 57. 
70. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 24, at 78. 
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Maize, supra note 40.
75. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 45.
76. Maize, supra note 40.
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earlier in the electricity distribution system, however, rather than at a 
consuming building.77
The grid is similarly vulnerable to an inside attack. Insiders have the 
knowledge and access to damage physical aspects such as transformers 
and switchgear. Employees with access to the utility company’s software 
could insert viruses or change programs to wreak havoc on control
systems.78 Background checks are essential and may be one of the few 
ways to prevent an attack. The system is hard to regulate because so many 
actors oversee its maintenance and protection, and each is becoming more 
dependent on computers.79 Many companies are pouring money into 
updating their infrastructure, but the ones who do not update will be the 
weakest links.80
Other actors in the electricity and energy sectors are putting effort into 
improving security. Batteries are still an important innovation; as companies 
design and develop new energy storage mechanisms, they will also need to 
be protected from attack. Some companies are working on bulletproof 
transformers.81 Transformers are an essential part of all power transmission 
networks and must be protected from external damage, including from 
firearms, the ownership of which is permitted in many jurisdictions in the 
United States. 
For example, an attack on transformers occurred on April 16, 2013, in 
San José, California, where snipers knocked out seventeen transformers in 
twenty minutes.82 Restoration cost about $15.4 million.83 Such events 
underscore the necessity of developing bulletproof transformers. 
The issue with both batteries and transformers is that they are physical 
embodiments of the grid and are therefore subject to physical attack. For 
cyberattack protection, one company, the Edison Electric Institute, has 
been working on a program called the Cyber Risk Information Sharing 
Program (CRISP).84 CRISP’s purpose is to help share real-time data, but 
                                                                                                            
77. Diane Cardwell, Grid Sensors Could Ease Disruptions of Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/business/energy-environ
ment/smart-sensors-for-power-grid-could-ease-disruptions.html.
78. TERRORISM & THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 48.
79. KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 28.
80. Id.
81. SIEMENS, TRANSFORMING FUTURE TRENDS INTO INNOVATIONS: SIEMENS 
BULLETPROOF TRANSFORMERS & REACTORS (2014), https://perma.cc/2N9P-HU8J.
82. Id.
83. Petter Fiskerud, Grid Resilience: Come Hell or High Water,
ELECTROINDUSTRY, Sept. 2016, at 11, https://perma.cc/6MM9-67TE.
84. KOPPEL, supra note 50, at 48.
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the data focuses on amounts of traffic and identifying IP addresses or 
malware.85 The project is still in its infancy.86
Some actors in the electricity industry have been participating in drills to 
prepare for security breaches and test grid security. GridEx, or Grid Exercises, 
are emergency drills organized by utilities and government agencies in 
Canada, the U.S., and Mexico to simulate physical attacks and cyberattacks 
that could take down large sections of the grid.87 Of course, as detrimental to 
the civilian population as an attack might be, the electric power industry has 
a greater interest in protecting itself; security efforts are complicated by the 
necessity of profiting and staying in business.88 While some government 
actors say the industry has a conflict of interest, some actors in the energy and 
electricity industry say that the government does not know enough about the 
science behind the grid.89 Either way, GridEx is a commendable team effort 
that should be continued.
The biggest issue with the current infrastructure is that there are a limited 
number of alternative paths that an electric current can take. Destruction of one 
cable could knock out power to a remote town. It would be simple for terrorists 
to short circuit cables, forcing a shutdown of supply to a main or local 
substation. Even if electricity was quickly rerouted, any immediate attacks on 
transformers further down the lines could cause new failures even when power 
is returned.90 Very little risk exists for the attacker of electric power transmission 
and distribution systems, especially if there is only a cyberattack.91
The updates the Smart Grid is intended to provide are necessary because of 
the increased age of the infrastructure, which creates safety risks and economic 
inefficiencies. Although computerization will always leave every computer and 
program at risk, instant identification of issues through Distribution Intelligence 
and smart meters as well as instant restriction of a blackout from spreading 
through microgrids are the best ways a cascading blackout can be prevented. 
Insofar as the Smart Grid blocks alternative paths for a blackout to spread and
creates alternative paths for electric current, it can increase grid security. As the 
National Research Council suggests in a 2012 report:
Even if all reasonable steps are taken to ensure the reliability of the 
electric power transmission and distribution system, and to speed 
its rapid restoration after outages, there is no way that it can be made 
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completely reliable in the face of major disruption by natural causes 
or large, well-planned terrorist attacks. For this reason, and because 
modern society is increasingly dependent on electric power for the 
provision of critical social services, steps should be taken to ensure 
that the most important of these services can continue to be 
sustained if power from the grid is not available.92
Preparation is an imperative response to the risk of an attack perceived by 
the industry.
III. TERRORISM IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A survey of both international and national law reveals that legal 
systems are unprepared to handle many types of terrorist threats, especially 
those on electricity infrastructure. Although discussion of terrorism 
permeates the news and the American psyche, laws on terrorism do not seem 
to be promulgated until after something goes wrong. If an attack took place 
and there were no legal remedy for victims, terrorists would accomplish all 
of their goals: spreading fear and provoking reactive policies through 
psychological warfare.93 The international community must continue to 
consider and discuss different legal approaches to the threat of terrorism and 
the best methods by which to prevent and punish it. This consideration and 
discussion should focus on three issues: (1) the nature of terrorism, (2) 
typical terrorist tactics, and (3) the reasons why people engage in terrorism 
to accomplish their goals. 
Terrorism is the systematic application of terror.94 More specifically, it 
is the “use or repeated threat of violence, in support of or in opposition to 
some authority, where violence is employed to induce fear or similar attack 
in as many non-immediate victims as possible so that those so threatened 
will accept and comply with the demands of terrorists.”95 Attacks usually 
provoke increased security measures, which lead to a reduction in civil 
liberties, and “thus the people will be turned against their leaders.”96
Reactionary decision-making limiting citizens’ rights, especially in the form 
of law, is evidence of terrorists justifying their resort to the use of fear-
inducing tactics. 
Although methods may vary, typical terrorist tactics have several 
common features, including: (1) the use of violence to persuade; (2) 
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selection of targets and victims for maximum propaganda value; (3) the use 
of unprovoked attacks; (4) maximum publicity at minimum risk; (5) use of 
surprise to circumvent countermeasures; (6) threats, harassment, and 
violence; (7) disregarding women and children as victims; (8) propaganda 
to maximize the effect; or (9) loyalty only to themselves and kindred 
groups.97 Most terrorists aim for publicity over sympathy; an act as simple 
as kidnapping and issuing a statement can bring worldwide attention to a 
cause.98 Indiscriminate, or preferably—for the terrorists—unpredictable, 
attacks will ensure a worldwide reaction.
People engage in terrorism for many reasons, for terrorism is a product 
of individual convictions as well as culture. Defining terrorism and 
providing legal consequences for it is important, but what some call 
terrorism could also be the product of another’s singular and exclusive 
understanding of the world.99 The most important lesson from recognizing 
the individualism of terrorism is that no single discipline or approach will 
ever eliminate violence.100 Recognizing how someone chooses to embrace 
terrorist tendencies is as important to crime prevention as building 
infrastructure. 
Electricity infrastructure is an advantageous target for terrorists 
because of the violent effects (some people may die immediately, others 
may die in the following weeks or months due to weather or starvation), 
the propaganda value, and the lack of risk to perpetrators in physical 
attacks and especially cyberattacks.101 There should be laws criminalizing 
these types of terrorist attacks, but none exist.
A. Indecisiveness in International Law
One reason for the absence of laws criminalizing these attacks is that 
international legal scholars and bodies have been unable to agree on a 
general legal definition for terrorism. In 1937, the League of Nations 
adopted a treaty requiring nation-states to criminalize acts of terrorism under 
their own laws, which was the first modern attempt to codify the crime of 
terrorism in international law.102
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International Conventions for the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism were held in 1998 and 1999. They did not define terrorism 
explicitly, but they asked states to criminalize any activity that violated 
certain treaties, caused death or serious bodily injury, or attempted or 
conspired to commit an act of terrorism.103
The United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution 51–201 of 1999, 
said, “Criminal Acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror . . . 
are in any circumstance unjustifiable,”which is a very broad condemnation.104
States struggle to agree on a definition for several reasons: (1) they reject 
definitions that are redundant—that is, overlap with war crimes or crimes 
against humanity; (2) some of them reject definitions that arguably include 
their own particular behavior; and (3) some reject definitions that do not 
include what they consider to be terrorist acts by their enemies. 
The International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
of 1998 provides an actual definition of terrorism:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, 
places, discharges, or detonates an explosive or other lethal device 
in, into or against a place of public use, a state or government 
facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure 
facility: (I) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, 
(II) with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, 
facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to 
result in major economic loss.105
A definition that mentions infrastructure, such as this one, directly protects 
part of the electricity infrastructure as well as other types of energy. This 
definition, however, exclusively focuses on bombing for the method of 
attack. A terrorist might attack electrical infrastructure in other ways. One 
can also find definitions for terrorism in the Convention of the Islamic 
Conference on Combating International Terrorism (1999), which does not 
mention infrastructure, and the Organization of African Unity Convention 
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which mentions only 
disrupting public services.106
The closest the international community has come to a consensus was 
in the United Nations’ Draft Comprehensive Convention Against 
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International Terrorism. This convention includes infrastructure in its 
definition of terrorism, last updated in 2002:
Any person commits an offense within the meaning of the present 
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and 
intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury, (b) 
Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of 
public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation 
system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or (c) 
damage to such property, places, facilities or systems resulting in 
or likely to result in major economic loss; When the purpose of 
the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act.107
States have heavily debated this definition without ever coming to a 
solution. The main issue is to whom this definition would apply and when 
it would apply, especially in cases of armed conflict. To this day, no 
international consensus exists about what constitutes the optimal legal 
definition of terrorism.
Other components of the international system that could provide 
protection for attacks on electricity infrastructure without a consensus on the 
definition of terrorism include international organizations, international 
humanitarian law, and international criminal law. 
One international organization with this power is the United Nations. 
The United Nations Security Council has proposed several resolutions on 
terrorism, but they are extremely limited in scope—for example, one is 
limited to plane hijackings. The first to address terrorism in general was 
Resolution 1269 (1999);108 Resolution 1269 also urged states to implement 
the terrorism conventions.109 Second, Resolution 1373, which was adopted 
in September 2001,110 required states to enact criminal laws prohibiting 
terrorism, especially the financing of terrorism.111 Third, Resolution 2178 
(2014), which links violent extremism and terrorism, required member 
states collectively to prevent radicalization and honor their agreements 
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under international human rights law.112 Fourth, Resolution 2199 obligated 
states to block the flow of profits from trade in oil, antiquities, and 
hostages to Iraq and Syria.113 Lastly, Resolution 2253 (2015) reaffirms the 
powers of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to [Resolutions] 
Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and Associated Individuals, Groups, 
Undertakings, and Entities and reestablishes a freeze on assets, an arms 
embargo, and a travel ban.114 None of these resolutions directly mentions 
electricity infrastructure. Trade of oil and assets is a higher priority, possibly 
because electricity infrastructure is seen as an internal consideration for 
states. Even the Secretary General’s Plan of Action Preventing Violent 
Extremism fails to mention infrastructure. The Plan lists the possible reasons 
for extremist activities on state and individual levels and establishes 
expectations for nations.115 Its only energy concern, however, is oil trade 
among terrorist groups.116
Second, international humanitarian law can and should condemn 
terrorist attacks on electricity infrastructure. The Geneva Conventions and 
the Additional Protocols are codifications of international humanitarian
law, or the law of armed conflict; the four separate Geneva Conventions 
were adopted in August 1949, Protocol I and II in 1977, and the third 
Protocol in 2005.117 Whether the conventions apply to a given attack 
depends on several factors: whether the terrorist is a state or non-state 
actor, the extent of damage to property, and the effect on citizens. The 
Geneva Conventions make several references to infrastructure, but none 
clearly provide for a terrorist attack on it. 
Each of the conventions has two important shared elements. First, 
common to the four Geneva Conventions, is Article III, which provides 
minimum standards of conduct for states in situations of non-international 
armed conflicts.118 This article requires humane treatment of people taking
no active part in hostilities and prohibits murder, cruel treatment, taking 
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hostages, and more.119 These requirements and prohibitions are important 
because many armed conflicts today are not international. Non-
international armed conflict is a conflict not between two or more high 
contracting parties to the convention, including conflicts internal to 
states.120 Usually, terrorists are not state actors, so Article III could apply. 
Second, these four Geneva Conventions also define “grave breaches” of 
humanitarian law, which are the most egregious violations.121 The Fourth 
Geneva Convention—which is most relevant to the discussion of 
infrastructure because it focuses on civilians—lists “taking of hostages 
and extensive destruction or appropriation of property” as a grave 
breach.122 A terrorist attack that destroyed electricity infrastructure could 
possibly qualify as a grave breach. This provision is the only one of the 
four conventions that could possibly apply.
Protocol I expands the list of grave breaches. The most relevant 
addition for the purposes of electricity security is Article 85(3)(c): 
“launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous 
forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, 
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.”123 This definition seems 
to include many types of infrastructure. Depending on the circumstances, 
a physical attack on some power plants might very well qualify. Similarly, 
Article 56 prohibits attacks on “[w]orks or installations containing 
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations . . . if such an attack may cause the release of dangerous forces 
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population,” with an 
exception for nuclear electricity generation stations that provide 
significant support for military operations.124 This provision would protect 
the generation components of the electric grid, but because it requires the 
works or installations to contain dangerous forces and for the attack to 
have the potential to release dangerous forces, the provision is very limited 
in scope. 
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Protocol II expands on Common Article III by adding to the list of 
prohibited acts in non-international conflicts.125 For the purposes of 
electricity infrastructure, there are three important additions. First, Article 
13(2) provides that “the civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited.”126 This is a direct prohibition of terrorism. 
Second, Article 14 prohibits “starvation of citizens as a method of combat”
which is a possible outcome of an attack on electricity infrastructure 
depending on the areas affected and the amount of time a blackout lasts.127
Too many factors influence the application of that provision. Third, Article 
14 prohibits destruction of “objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population.”128 The provision lists “foodstuffs, crops, livestock, 
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works” as 
examples of objects indispensable to survival.129 Electricity is not listed. 
The necessity of water infrastructure is comparable to the necessity of 
electricity infrastructure, suggesting that an analogy should be made to 
extend the protection. 
Given these provisions, the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols can be interpreted to include a terrorist attack on energy 
infrastructure. Still, this interpretation requires some skillful argumentation. 
Third, international criminal law could provide protection for attacks 
on electricity infrastructure without a consensus on the definition of 
terrorism. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court creates 
individual criminal liability rather than state liability.130 It came into effect 
in 2002 and has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.131 Under the Rome 
Statute, a terrorist attack on electricity infrastructure would be most likely 
to qualify as either a crime against humanity or a war crime. A crime 
against humanity is an act “committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack” that falls within the provided list or is similarly inhumane, 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
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health.132 An attack on electricity infrastructure would probably not fall 
into the enumerated list of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute
but possibly could fall into the “other inhumane acts” category. Such an 
attack, if carefully planned, could cause great suffering, but it must rise to 
the standard of attacking human dignity with great humiliation or 
degradation to fall into this category. 
An attack might qualify as a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute. All grave breaches under the 1949 Geneva Conventions qualify as 
war crimes, namely, “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, 
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly.”133 Infrastructure that qualifies as private property—which is 
the majority of electricity infrastructure in the United States—should fall 
under this definition. Other war crime provisions that might include attacks 
on infrastructure include: “intentionally directing attacks against civilian 
objects,” “destroying or seizing the enemy’s property,” and “intentionally 
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental 
loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.”134 These 
enumerations seem to address the terrorist attack method in question.135
There is no precedent to say a cyberattack on infrastructure would qualify 
as an attack on a civilian object, but the provisions might cover some 
physical attacks. 
Finally, “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable [sic] to survival” is a 
war crime, as previously discussed regarding Protocol II.136 For many 
Americans, deprivation of electricity could certainly lead to starvation—
but this argument is weak. 
The first issue with using war crimes to charge alleged terrorists under 
international law is that they are not state actors, and technically could not 
declare war. Article 8(e), however, extends many of these provisions to 
armed conflicts not of an international character, similar to Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.137
                                                                                                            
132. Id. art. 7.
133. Id. art. 8.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. As an example: The international community does not recognize ISIL 
(Da’esh) as a state. If any members were charged in the ICC for their actions, they 
might argue that they did not commit war crimes because they were refused statehood 
status. However, if an actor is operating as if it is a state, maybe the ICC should hold 
it accountable as states would be. Hopefully, Protocol II and Art. 8(e) of the Rome 
Statute can be construed to hold these people accountable for their actions. 
2018] COMMENT 525
The second issue is that the Rome Statute does not directly address 
terrorism; terrorism is not its own offense. While acts of terrorism might 
occur during a war, not all of them do.138 In cases where classifying 
terrorism as a crime against humanity rather than a war crime would be 
preferable, the “other” category does not satisfy the need to address the 
condemnable acts. International criminal law would ideally be a remedy for 
prosecution of terrorists, but International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutors 
might struggle to squeeze an attack on electricity infrastructure into the 
ICC’s narrow definitions of crimes.
Terrorists, as non-state actors, may not hold themselves to the standards 
or principles of international organizations, international humanitarian law, 
or international criminal law, so no limit exists to the atrocities they could 
commit against citizens. International politics in the post-Cold War period 
are characterized by an unprecedented fluidity, where it’s unclear who can 
do what to whom and with what means they can do it.139 The Westphalian 
system—a political scheme that recognized the nation-state as the exclusive 
sovereign actor—has transformed, so that it is almost impossible not to 
recognize the plurality of actors.140 Unrestrained by borders in the way that 
states are, terrorist actors can recruit and perpetrate crimes around the world. 
The concept of conventional warfare is not as relevant in the twenty-first 
century due to the diffusion of modern technology.141 Terrorists have 
influence in international politics because they use violence to create, 
rather than express, identity.142 The law must explicitly condemn those 
possible atrocities. 
B. Failures in Federal Criminal Law and Energy Policy 
If either a physical or cyberattack on electricity infrastructure 
occurred, federal criminal law would not provide an explicit remedy in 
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most situations. Four statutes in the section on terrorism might implicate 
an attack on infrastructure. First, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b criminalizes terrorist 
attacks from foreign sources.143 This statute never directly references 
electricity infrastructure, but it does criminalize the destruction of property. 
Any terrorist attack on infrastructure from a domestic source could not be 
prosecuted under this statute. 
Second, 18 U.S.C. § 2332f criminalizes bombings of infrastructure 
facilities if the actor intends to cause death or serious bodily injury or 
“inten[ds] to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility, or system,
where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic 
loss.”144 This statute only applies to bombings, however, and does not extend 
to any other kind of physical attack, including cyberattacks. 
Third, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B establishes the crime of providing material 
support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.145“Material 
support or resources”means providing to a terrorist “any property . . . financial 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation.”146
Material support prosecutions do not require an act of terrorism, as the statute 
criminalizes both attempt and conspiracy, so they have been essential to post-
9/11 strategies of preventive prosecutions.147 If a terrorist is not working with 
a designated foreign terrorist organization, the provisions will not apply. 
Fourth, alternatively or in conjunction with criminal liability, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333(a) creates a civil action for persons, property, and businesses subject 
to an act of international terrorism.148 Whether “international terrorism” in 
this statute would include a situation where an American citizen plans an 
attack in the United States for a foreign terrorist organization is unclear, 
although that situation would qualify as material support. It would not 
apply to an American national without ties to foreign terrorist groups. 
The problem with these four statutes is that they are under-inclusive. They 
exclude terrorists from the United States or terrorists that do not support a 
specific organization. None of them contemplate a terrorist attack that does 
not cause physical damage. A terrorist attack that causes physical damage 
without a bomb would not fall under these statutes. Even worse, none of them 
consider a cyberattack. Congress fails to acknowledge a basic concept of 
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terrorism: anyone might desire to cause fear and influence the government. 
With an infrastructure so widespread, intricate, and integral as the electric 
grid, anyone with the right skills and intent to cause fear can succeed in an 
attack. Terrorism is not limited to the organizations that the United States has 
chosen to label. Clearly, American policy is to condemn terrorism, but no 
statute is written in a way that provides sufficient actus reus for attacking 
electricity infrastructure in the likely ways that a terrorist might.
It would be Congress’s responsibility to pass a statute regarding attacks; 
Congress also plays an essential role in the recognition of issues with the 
grid—whether efficiency or safety—and providing funding. In 2008, a 
congressional commission first investigated the likelihood of an EMP 
attack.149 The commission found that several states, including Russia, North 
Korea, China, and Iran, were capable of perpetrating such an attack; some 
terrorist organizations also had this ability.150 More recently, the Senate 
committee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs considered 
CIPA, or the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.151 Its purpose is 
to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the Department of 
Homeland Security to assess the threat posed by EMPs and geomagnetic 
disturbances (GMD) to infrastructure.152 Geomagnetic disturbances, like 
EMPs, which occur naturally or with nuclear devices, could cause immediate 
damage to the grid—at a minimum, some experts predict, twenty to forty 
million people could lose power for two years.153 The Electromagnetic Pulse 
Commission stated that the Department of Homeland Security has addressed 
threats to the electric grid at large, but it is problematic that it has no statutory 
obligation to address the commission’s recommendations.154 CIPA would 
require the Department of Homeland Security to prepare a strategy to protect 
infrastructure against EMP and GMD specifically. CIPA was introduced in 
2013 and has not moved out of committee.155 A second piece of legislation, 
the Secure High-Voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage 
Act, or SHIELD, was introduced the same year.156 Neither piece of legislation 
has moved past their committees. It is doubtful that members of Congress 
have suddenly found that an EMP attack is unlikely. Addressing the concerns 
could cost a couple billion dollars, so the failure to pass legislation is most 
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likely related to funding or political gridlock.157 If Congress is genuinely 
concerned about terrorism, it should consider a response to terrorism post-
attack as well, which includes funding a preventive increase in the 
resiliency of the grid. 
As representatives of the American population, Congressmen fall into 
the hysteria-induced trap of terrorism’s systematic application of panic by 
focusing on the most dramatic types of attacks rather than the ones that are 
likely to happen and failing to address simpler vulnerabilities. 
It would be detrimental to everyone if a terrorist used nuclear, biological, 
or chemical weapons to harm Americans. Nuclear terrorism, bioterrorism, and
chemical warfare, however, all have their own criminal provisions while the 
vulnerable electric grid is unprotected.158 Congress’s concern over an EMP 
attack is good news, but it overlooks the more simple ways a terrorist attack 
could work. 
Congress’s usual reaction to a terrorist attack is to fund the rebuilding 
of stronger, more solid systems that could withstand the stressor that failed 
the previous one, but resiliency is about more than taking preventive action. 
Resiliency is “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and 
withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.”159 Developing the ability 
to recover rapidly is as important as having strong preventive protections. 
Our electricity infrastructure will improve with Smart Grid updates, but it 
will still be vulnerable to attack. Criminal statutes are an essential part of a 
response plan to a terrorist attack. Grid resiliency is an unattainable goal as 
long as there is no punishment for attacking it. 
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO SIMPLIFY PROSECUTION 
AND PROTECT CITIZENS
The severity of a potential terrorist attack on the currently vulnerable 
electric grid justifies revamping the electric grid. As helpful as the Smart 
Grid sounds, it will be years before it is completely implemented throughout 
the country. Legal systems should be prepared for an attack in the meantime. 
The unsatisfactory legal framework to address criminal activity leaves 
victims naked and afraid—allowing terrorists to be successful in their goals 
of inflicting violence and fear. 
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A. Options for a Unified International Approach
There are two solutions to the issue of impunity for alleged terrorists 
under international law. First, the international legal regime has thus far 
failed to create a comprehensive legal framework regarding terrorism. 
Revisiting the Draft Comprehensive Convention Against International 
Terrorism would be beneficial for any state hoping to establish legal 
justifications for potential terrorist attacks against it. This convention should 
grant criminal jurisdiction to the ICC, and—in case a state conducts a 
cyberattack—jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice. While many 
acts of terrorism rise to the level of crime against humanity under the Rome 
Statute, the physical, cyber, and electromagnetic methods of attack on 
electricity infrastructure do not fall directly under the language. Considering 
that the purpose of establishing crimes against humanity is to capture the 
most egregious of offenses against human beings, it is inappropriate to 
include these attacks unless a long-term blackout does occur. Relief should 
be created elsewhere in the law. 
Second, a provision extending the Rome Statute to acts of terror with a 
new clause adding a mens rea to incite terror would clarify the applicability 
of those provisions. Article 8 of the Rome Statute, regarding war crimes, 
does not provide consolation either; whether people can be punished for acts 
of terrorism should not depend on statehood status. War crimes are either 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or violations of other laws 
applicable in international armed conflict.160 If a terrorist is not a member of 
a government or commits an act that does not fall into the Conventions’
common Article III non-international conflicts extension, then he cannot be 
prosecuted in the ICC. 
Leaders of terrorist organizations should be liable for their organized acts 
of violence and lone wolf terrorists should still be culpable for their unilateral 
acts. Currently under the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction 
over terrorism as its own offense, and it is unlikely member states would 
approve of the change.161 Terrorist attacks can be severe enough to match or 
include some of the other crimes the court has jurisdiction over.
Adding a section to the crimes against humanity or war crimes sections 
providing that any of the listed actions with the “intent to incite fear or terror”
is under the ICC’s jurisdiction would be the smallest extension of authority 
possible to include terrorism in the Rome Statute. Terrorism, by definition, is 
using violence to incite fear, and the acts of violence are already listed. Adding 
this requisite intent specifically implicates terrorism and clarifies the 
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jurisdiction of prosecutors. This is a narrow extension of jurisdiction 
compared to adding an entire category of crimes to the Rome Statute. 
Out of the two solutions, ratification of the Draft Convention on Terrorism 
or a similar instrument would be the preferable solution because of the unified 
approach, but criminal liability under the Rome Statute would also solve the 
issue of the absence of specific laws to address a terrorist attack on electricity 
infrastructure. Either way, international law on the issue of terrorism is essential 
because it provides a safety net for nations without terrorism laws, jurisdiction 
restraints, or other reasons for inability to individually prosecute. Impunity is 
unacceptable. The pooled power of nation-states in condemnation of terrorism 
would have more influence in ending the phenomenon than the classic and 
problematic West-East dichotomy.162
B. Proposal for a Specific and Targeted Domestic Statute
The United States justice system is vast, but it may need the 
international law safety net because the criminal laws are insufficient to 
prosecute terrorists to the extent that its policy condemns them. Prosecution 
of terrorists is essential to incapacitate them, gather intelligence, and deter 
future acts of terrorism.163
A recent study164 on prosecuting terrorism cases in federal courts came 
to several conclusions. First, the criminal justice system is insufficient to 
address international terrorism alone, and the government must draw on its 
military, intelligence, diplomacy, economic, and law enforcement systems 
as well.165 Second, terrorism cases are extremely complex and produce 
strain on the criminal justice system.166 Third, the criminal justice system 
is prone to many types of errors but is workable and credible in general.167
A statute covering an attack on electricity infrastructure must simplify the 
complexities and challenges for the criminal justice system.
There are three main reasons passing a specific federal statute is the best 
solution for protecting the electricity infrastructure. First, as of today, if a 
physical or cyberattack were to take place, a prosecutor would most likely 
pick the most relevant statutes on terrorism and the individual acts of harming 
private property and list them all in a complaint to get the terrorist into court. 
The statutes might not all be optimally targeted to address particular acts. 
Procedurally, this does not hurt the prosecutor because a more accurate 
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superseding indictment can always be filed later. This approach, however, is 
an inefficient waste of government time and money. 
Second, a specific statute would streamline prosecutions. Nuclear 
terrorism, bioterrorism, and chemical warfare all have their own criminal 
provisions;168 therefore, a separate statute criminalizing an attack on an 
enumerated list of Smart Grid components would have precedent. An attack 
on electricity infrastructure could be as damaging to businesses and lives as 
any other type of terrorism. A more specific provision would make 
prosecution simpler and clarify the actions that would violate the law.
Third, a specifically tailored statute is necessary to avoid excessive rights 
infringements. Legislators should keep in mind that terrorists intend, through 
their attacks, to motivate increased security measures, which restricts freedom 
at home. The vicious cycle of violence followed by increased security measures 
limits U.S. citizens without preventing terrorism. A statute punishing a specific 
type of crime, rather than sweeping restrictions or regulations, is narrow and 
will not negatively affect citizens that choose not to engage in terrorist attacks.
An ideal statute criminalizing a terrorist attack on electricity infrastructure 
would include several elements. First, it must be aimed at several types of 
terrorists, whether lone actors or groups. 
Second, it would also criminalize attempt and conspiracy. Inchoate 
liability could deter many attacks.
Third, it would have separate and detailed sections on physical attacks 
and cyberattacks. The physical attacks section would criminalize property 
damage as other statutes do, but broaden the methods by which it is possible. 
For example, shooting a transformer with guns, bombing a power plant, or 
dropping weapons on a power station via drone should all fall under the 
language of the statute. The cyberattacks section would contemplate an attack 
from someone inside a utility company and from a basement on the other side 
of the world. It would protect the SCADA systems and each component of 
the new Smart Grid system so that the statute does not become outdated as the 
grid updates. In both the physical and cyberattacks sections, each component 
of the grid should be covered. The statute should be written to protect both the 
current electrical grid and the anticipated technologies of the Smart Grid. 
Fourth, the statute would include a mens rea element of purpose or 
knowledge. The language should include the intent to incite fear or perpetrate 
violence on the grid, the industry supporting it, and the citizens using it. 
Fifth, the statute would have a section on jurisdiction similar to 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B(d), the material support statute, which establishes that the 
United States has jurisdiction whether the offender is a U.S. national or not. 
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A statute satisfying these five conditions would sufficiently protect the 
electricity grid. The danger of enumerated lists of any crimes or types of 
crimes is that it could be under-inclusive. To address adequately the risk 
of a terrorist attack of any type, however, a framework should be laid out 
ahead of time. If deterrence is truly a value of the criminal justice system, 
potential defendants deserve knowledge that an act is criminalized before 
they commit it. Providing a specific legal framework for terrorism 
improves protection of due process rights. Terrorism is common enough 
in the twenty-first century to justify a specific and targeted legal response. 
With respect to criminal liability, federal government regulations will 
continue to address the risk of an attack on energy infrastructure inadequately 
because of the transnational quality of terrorism. Industry and the government 
must work together to an extent to decide on an optimal level of information 
sharing for terrorism prevention. It is good business for the electric industry 
to protect itself.169 The energy sector may be more successful operating on its 
own rather than working to meet federal regulations, which is why the 
government should reciprocate those efforts through laws that directly punish 
threats to the industry. 
CONCLUSION
International and national laws should more expressly address threats to 
the electricity infrastructure. Experts agree that the severity of a possible 
attack is a sufficient reason to focus on improving the electricity infrastructure. 
The Smart Grid is a crucial step towards improving security and a necessary 
twenty-first century update to infrastructure, but care should be taken in 
increased interconnectivity between grids. In the immediate future, before the 
Smart Grid is completed, legal steps are necessary to deter and protect the 
industry from attack. The electric industry must take steps towards updating 
the Smart Grid as quickly as economically feasible, and the government must 
quickly create a response plan that includes criminal liability for alleged 
terrorists. Preparation for such an attack should build confidence that if 
anything happens, the United States will be ready. 
Melissa R. Wheeler
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